Educational effect of a licence suspension despite the passage of time
In a recent ruling dated April 2, 2025 (1C_140/2025), the Federal Supreme Court confirmed that the imposition of a license suspension by the administrative authority—three years and two months after the offense—did not justify waiving or reducing the measure, given that the sanction still retained its full educational and corrective effect.
Case Summary:
In January 2022, A. was caught driving at 114 km/h in an 80 km/h zone on a road in the canton of Vaud. In June 2022, the Cantonal Vehicle Office issued a three-month driving license suspension, qualifying the offense as serious. A. filed an objection, but the administrative procedure was suspended pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings. In August 2022, A. was convicted (20 daily fines with a suspended sentence, plus a fine). This conviction was upheld on appeal in November 2022, and by the Federal Supreme Court in July 2023. In October 2024, the Vehicle Office confirmed the three-month suspension, to be enforced between April and July 2025. The cantonal court rejected A.’s appeal in February 2025.
The offender appealed to the Federal Supreme Court, invoking a violation of the principle of promptness and his right to a trial within a reasonable time, as guaranteed by Art. 29 para. 1 of the Swiss Constitution and Art. 6 para. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). According to established case law, to be dissuasive and fair, a criminal sanction must be imposed and executed within a reasonable time after the offense. A. argued that a delay of three years between the offense and the execution of the sanction was excessive and undermined its deterrent effect.
Federal Supreme Court Decision:
The Court did not side with the appellant and rejected the argument of excessive delay. The federal judges referred to their previous case law (ATF 135 II 334), which held that even delays of seven or ten years between the offense and the final ruling did not eliminate the educational effect of the sanction. Such durations were deemed compatible with the principle of promptness. In this case, the criminal and administrative proceedings had been conducted with reasonable diligence, given that “only” three years and two months had passed between the speeding offense and the Federal Court’s ruling. This period was considered well below the temporal threshold at which a sanction could be deemed to have lost all educational value. The appeal was therefore dismissed, and the three-month license suspension was upheld.
Written by Me Yves Mabillard